Three Problems in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Δ7, 1017a22-30

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In *Metaphysics* Δ7 (1017a7-b9), Aristotle classifies the meaning of 'being' into four categories: 'being incidentally', 'being in itself', 'being as true' and 'being potentially or actually'. This paper focuses on the passage (1017a22-30) in which 'being in itself' is defined, poses three problems with the passage, and attempts to find solutions to each of them.

The passage comprises four sentences, and the first problem concerns the first sentence, which states that things which signify the figures of predication are said to be in themselves, but on what grounds. The key to solving this problem lies in the fact that 'things which signify the figures of predication' in the first sentence, 'things predicated' in the dependent clause of the third sentence and 'to be' in the main clause of the third sentence are mutually substituted and taken as equivalent. The paper provides a solution to the first problem by proving that the first sentence is derived through the formation of two equivalent sentences from these expressions according to Aristotle's thesis that 'to be is to be something or other'.

The second problem concerns the fourth sentence, 'For there is no difference between "man is keeping healthy" and "man keeps healthy", nor between "man is walking, or cutting" and "man walks, or cuts", and equally in the other cases'. The fourth sentence is problematic because it appears without context and its purpose is unclear. The paper therefore takes two sentences with the same form of expression as the fourth sentence (*De Interpretatione* 21b9-10 and *Prior Analytics* 51b13-15) and examines their purpose and meaning. The results show that the fourth sentence is an example of a circumlocution (periphrasis) to adjectivise the present participle of a verb, and that its purpose is to transform an affirmative proposition in which a finite verb appears, into the standard form of an affirmative proposition, in which the copulative 'is' is added to the present participle as a predicate. This is the solution to the second problem.

The third problem is as follows. If it follows from the first sentence and the main clause of the third sentence that all predicates, including the figures of predication, are said to be in themselves, then how can the verb 'to be' here be specified for them? The paper gives a solution to this problem by treating 'to be' as a variable that takes them as its value, i.e., a predicate variable, and cites two examples (*Physics* 263b23-26 and *De Interpretatione* 21b12-14), showing that the present participle form is used as a predicate variable in the former and the infinitive in the latter, respectively.