Knowledge and Ignorance in the *Prior Analytics* B21 -- Aristotle's commentaries on Plato's *Meno* --

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Aristotle explicitly mentions Plato's Meno twice in his Analytics (67a21, 71a29). Namely, in the Prior Analytics B21, on the one hand, Aristotle refers to the theory of recollection: inquiring or learning is recollection (anamnesis), which is proposed by Plato in the Meno, and in the Posterior Analytics A1, on the other hand, he refers to Meno's paradox (he calls Meno's aporia) which has a logical form of constructive dilemma: it is impossible to inquire or learn something whether it is already known or not. Then, It has been questionable how Aristotle evaluates the theory of recollection, and how he takes advantage of it to construct his own arguments unfolding in the Prior Analytics B21 and the Posterior Analytics A1, while it is also disputable whether the theory of recollection is supposed by Plato himself to be a genuine solution to Meno's paradox. In this paper I try to elucidate what Aristotle intends to argue for by making reference to the *Meno* in the contexts of his own arguments. Then, firstly I shall focus on the context of the Prior Analytics B21, which argues about possibilities of coexistence of knowledge and ignorance. By analyzing his arguments developing there, I try to identify his own solution to the constructive dilemma raised by Meno's paradox. Secondly I shall compare the context of the Prior Analytics B21 with that of the Posterior Analytics A1 in order to investigate how these two contexts go together and how they are different in motivation. In concluding, I try to clarify that these two contexts are concerned with two different aspects of the same paradox: the former (the Prior Analytics B21) is motivated by the compatibility of knowledge and ignorance, which can be a radical solution to the paradox, and the latter (the Posterior Analytics A1) is concerned with how it is possible to start learning (mathesis), which is a main theme of its Book A, while how to achieve inquiry (zetesis) will be argued mainly in its Book B.