

Notes on Plato's Paradeigmatism

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This essay consists of longer endnotes on my *Routes to Plato's Paradeigmatism*, of which main signposts are as follows: first, the Socratic disavowal of knowledge leads to the paradox of inquiry and its solution, i.e. the theory of recollection; next, the recollection of the Form (Φ or F-ness) performs a complementary function in the sense-perception (F) which by itself is of deficient character; and thirdly, the method of diaeresis is founded upon a 'kinship of all nature', that is an indispensable premise of the theory of recollection since *Meno*. And my notes concerns the above second and third signposts.

(1) The route from the *anamnesis* to the theory of Forms is prepared by conception that sensible features display their deficiency. In the relation to sense-perception, the recollection is different from concept formation, since it is a process, not yet completed.

(2) In *Resp.* 505a-506c, Socrates grudges to say what the Good is and continues to make a give-and-take with Adimantus about 'belief', until it is interrupted by Glaucon. This somewhat comically exaggerated scene reminds us of the discussion about knowledge and belief, where the 'belief' is assigned double meanings, both of a different capacity from knowledge, and of an inferior state of knowledge as if half-blindness. This distinction is significant, for the so-called two worlds theory follows from supposing that such belief is nothing but a self-completed capacity in its own category.

(3) In spite of the argumentation of G.E.L.Owen, what is shown in *Polit.* 285d-286a is that the participant in any Forms, i.e. a sensible particular, is related to that Form as a likeness to its original. Owen ignores the lines 286d9-10 that most people have been unaware of the following distinction, which would not be enough plain to be seen clearly even by children as he interprets it.